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Abstract 
We develop a monopolistically competitive model for a closed economy without 
contract incompleteness. We show that if superior technology is not allowed to be 
transferred, integration would be the best mode of organization given that the 
transaction cost of intermediate input is sufficiently small. However, transferability of 
technology calls for adding the dimension of factor intensity of input. We then prove 
that integration could be the better option only when input production technology is 
capital-intensive. Thus we validate the empirical claim of Antras (2003) from a 
perspective other than incomplete contract. 
 
Key words:  Transaction Cost, Technology Transfer, Outsourcing, Organization of  
Production, Intra-firm Trade. 
JEL classification: D23, O14, L23, F12. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Choice of organization of firm has come up as the most interesting topic of research 
in industrial organization and trade theory in the recent past. Intra-industry trade was 
the major point of concern before firms’ organizational choice issue has garnered the 
attention. We know that intra-industry trade takes place between similar countries 
whereas trade is of Heckscher-Ohlin type if it is between dissimilar countries. 
Substantial amount of literature is there to corroborate the claim. However, the focus 
has been shifted recently to intra-firm and inter-firm trade. Hence the issue of choice of 
mode of organization has been taking the front seat. In what follows, the current 
research has been tilted towards the choice between outsourcing (inter-firm trade), be it 
domestic or international and integration (intra-firm) of production organization. 
Empirical papers suggest that integration is more profitable if production of input turns 
out to be capital-intensive. Zeile (1997) has shown that roughly more than 30% of world 
trade is taking place within the firm boundaries, i.e. intra-firm. Another remarkable 
phenomenon is the biasness of capital-intensive industries or inputs towards intra-firm 
trade and inter-firm if otherwise. Drawing the seminal work of Grossman and Hart 
(1986), Antras (2003) nicely elaborated how and why contract incompleteness could 
help explaining the empirical findings. He developed a property rights model of firm 
boundaries and satisfactorily explained why intra-firm trade is heavily concentrated in 
capital-intensive industries. There is a growing literature which put emphasize on the 
integration vs. outsourcing debate. Grossman & Helpman (2002, 2004, 2005), Antras 
(2005a, 2005b), Antras and Helpman (2004), Grossman and Rosi-Hansberg (2008) etc. 
are some other interesting papers in this tradition. The frameworks they have used are 
so parsimonious to have generated some particularly sharp theorems in economics. In 
another paper Acemoglu, Antras and Helpman (2007) introduced the idea of 
technology adoption in a world with both complete and incomplete contracts. But their 
focus was not the organization of production. Their attempt was to show how the 
degree of contractual incompleteness and the technological complementarities among 
intermediate inputs affect the choice of technology. 
 
In this paper we build on a monopolistically competitive model with final good 
and an intermediate input to argue the same that have been highlighted in Antras 
(2003). However, unlike Antras (2003) we do frame our model in a world without 
contract incompleteness and we also abstract from any sort of information asymmetry 
whatsoever. We shall start with the basic reason of outsourcing. It is the cost difference. 
The underlying implication is that if factor returns are identical across firms, the stand 
alone firm (who gets the outsourced work) must have superior technology over their 
‘affiliated’ counterpart. This makes outsourcing a lucrative option for the final good 
producer. We further assume that shipment of input from supplier to final good 
producer requires some transaction cost which is absent when output and input 
producing firms are integrated. These issues are a bit touched upon in Markusen (1984) 
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and Brainard (1997). We also presuppose that superior technology is not transferable 
from stand-alone supplier to final good producer. If the better technology could be 
transferred free of cost the final good producing firm would have never thought of 
opting for vertically integrating the mode of production organization. We then extend 
our model to introduce technology transferability, but at certain cost. In doing so we 
presume that transferring capital or capital-technology is relatively easier than that of 
labor. This argument was put forth by Dunning (1983), Milgrom and Roberts (1993). 
This assumption is quite sensible in that managing workers, be it skilled or unskilled, 
calls for a physical presence of authority in the production site. Here it is worth 
mentioning that in a paper Pack and Saggi (2001) showed how vertical transfer of 
technology through international outsourcing can lead to benefit both by reducing the 
double marginalization problem. 
The basic result that we derive in this paper is that a lower transaction cost for 
input makes integration less profitable when technology can not be transferred. And 
allowing for technology transfer indicates higher profit for integrating firm if input 
production is capital-intensive. 
The rest of the paper is schematized as follows. In section II we develop the 
environment to formulate the model in a closed economy. Section III describes the 
behavior of final good producing firm with both transferability and non-transferability 
of efficient technology. Industry equilibrium is shown in section IV. The last section 
provides with some concluding remarks. Nevertheless, the relevant mathematical 
details are relegated to the Appendix. 
 
II. ENVIRONMENT 
 
Here we build up a closed economy framework along the lines proposed by 
Antras (2003), Grossman and Helpman (2002). The economy is characterized by the 
existence of two factors of production namely capital (K) and labor (L). These factors are 
employed to produce a continuum of varieties of a single commodity X. We assume the 
love-for-variety utility function following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Different varieties of 
good X are considered as differentiated goods to the prospective buyers. Therefore the 
utility function for the representative consumer is given by the following. n is the total 
number of varieties produced in the economy. 
   	
   	             (1) 
Note that x(i) implies the variety of good X and  is the measure of 
substitutability between two varieties of final consumable good X namely x(i) and x(j). 
Each variety requires a specifically tailored intermediate input, m. Transformation of 
intermediate input into final good requires no further processing and hence no further 
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cost. Input could be procured from two sources.  One is integrated firm (implying intra-
firm trade) and other is stand-alone supplier (implying inter-firm trade). Both the 
integrated firm and independent firm can supply same quality input but at different 
costs. Stand-alone supplier has the cost advantage over integrated firm since it has 
access to superior technology. 
For simplicity let us assume that the technology of intermediate input production 
for the stand-alone firm (supplier) be Cobb-Douglas. 
            (2) 
m denotes one unit of intermediate input and O stands for outsourcing (stand-
alone supplier). We further assume that one unit of m is required to produce one unit of 
final good without adding any extra cost. And  is the factor intensity of m, i.e.  . 
The input production technology for the integrated firm is denoted by 
       ;       ! 1    (3) 
Here   represents the inefficiency parameter for the integrated supplier. 
However, let us assume that there is a fixed cost of production associated with 
input. We further assume that the fixed cost is same for all modes of organization. Let it 
be  #$%&. This assumption is made in line of Antras (2003). The cost function here 
resembles the same factor intensity like variable cost. 
Since the input is specific to a particular variety of final good our framework is, 
essentially, a bi-lateral monopoly. There are large number of input suppliers and final 
good producers. Per variety producer is one. The input is absolutely useless if it is not 
bought by the respective final good producer. This phenomenon transforms the 
competitive environment into bilateral monopoly. Assumption of large number of 
varieties helps ruling out the strategic behavior on part of the intermediate input 
producer.  
 In this paper our prime focus would be to check the role of technology 
transferability in determining the mode of organization. Thus we shall assume away 
any sort of contract incompleteness just to avoid the issues of asymmetric information 
related hold-up problem or allocation of residual rights of control. These two were the 
main driving forces in Antras (2003). 
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III. FIRM BEHAVIOR 
III. A. Regime-I 
We first consider the non-transferability of technology. Final good producer (G) 
has to choose between integration (I) and outsourcing (O). G is a profit maximizer. The 
stand-alone input supplier (S) also maximizes its own profit. In fact, S is non-existent in 
case of integration. Integration implies a single vertically integrated unit of production 
even if there is an input supplier. 
To solve for the relevant variables let us assume that the total income or total 
expenditure of the representative consumer is symbolized by E. 
Therefore,  '   ( 
         (4) 
From utility maximization principle one gets, 
For variety i,      ) *	  +,-+      (5) 
For variety j,   .   ) */	  +,-+      (6) 0 is the standard Lagrange multiplier. 
From equation (5) and (6) we get, 
11/   **/ +,-+          (7) 
In what follows, the elasticity of substitution between two different varieties is 
expressed by  2. 
2  	          (8) 
Demand for x(j) could be represented by 
.  3*/4  *+-4 56  7      (9) 
Let us define the index of prices of all varieties as  
8  9: (; 


 <
;
 
Here it is important to note that p(i) = p(j) for symmetric assumption. Hence 
equation (9) can be reproduced as  
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.  '. 8;. (.;      
Since the number of firms are taken to be a continuum, the value of  '. 8; 
could be considered as given. Let us call it F. 
So,    .  >. (.;;       where >  '. 8;    (10) 
By virtue of representative consumer and symmetric assumptions all varieties 
must have same price are consumed in equal amounts. This implies  
(.  (  ( ?@A 
and 
.     ?@A 
 Solving for the profit maximizing prices for all varieties (considering equation (2) 
as the relevant production function) we have, 
(  BCD+-C	        (11) 
 Equation (11) states the text-book kind of mark-up pricing for goods which are 
supplied in a monopolistically competitive market. Therefore, for given wage rate & and rental rate %, the profit of the final good producer (G), when inputs are 
procured from a stand-alone supplier, is given by  
FG,  >. %&;. ; H	 I 1J I #$%&  
Or,  FG,  >. %&;. ; H ;J I #$%&        (12) 
Following the same procedure we can arrive at the profit for G when input 
supplier is an affiliated unit of G. This is 
FG,  >. %&;. ; H ;J  ; I #$%&         (13) 
Comparing (12) and (13) we find that FG, ! FG,  (since 2 ! 1). Therefore 
we can propose that: 
Proposition 1: When technology transfer is not possible outsourcing is invariably the preferred 
mode of organization compared to integration. 
This result is quite apparent. If there is no other cost than the cost of production, 
inefficiency parameter will hinder the integration possibility. Now to make things more 
closer to reality let us introduce a transaction cost or trading cost for the intermediate 
input produced by unaffiliated supplier. Let the cost be K. K is the per unit trading cost. 
Evidently this cost is not needed for integrating firms. Hence there would be tug of war 
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between inefficiency-cost and trading-cost. Outsourcing would no more be an obvious 
mode of organization. Under this circumstance the profit function for G when non-
integration is opted for is : FG,  ( I %&. . K I #$%&    where K is 
a top-up over cost of production and K ! 1. In what follows, equation (12) boils down to 
FG,  >. %&;. ; H ;J K; I #$%&       (12 ‘) 
Let us start from a situation where the values of equation (12 ‘) and (13) are same. 
For constant inefficiency parameter (no option for technical progress), if  K goes up, the 
value of  FG, will become relatively less. 
Corollary 1.1: Firms’ choice between integration and outsourcing crucially depends on the 
values of   @L K .  
 A reduction in transaction cost implies higher profits for non-integrating firms. 
Nevertheless, if transaction cost is sufficiently high the final good producer may not opt 
for outsourcing even if it needs to do with inefficient production otherwise. This idea 
essentially corroborates the recent shift in mode of organization from integration to 
outsourcing as an aftermath of information technology revolution. Perhaps the prime 
reason was the huge slash in transaction cost that took place in information technology 
sector.  
III. B. Regime-II 
In the last section we considered a regime where technology was not 
transferable. Now we will think about a regime shift from non-transferability to 
transferability of input production technology. Technology is transferable but it 
requires some cost. As discussed earlier, we further assume that the cost of technology 
transfer is decreasing in  ratio. Therefore the cost associated with technology transfer 
significantly depends on whether intermediate input production technology is capital 
intensive or labor intensive. 
The cost of production of input (m) when technology is transferred from stand-
alone supplier (S) to final good producer (G) takes the following form. 
M   &. N O %. P1 O Q O #$%&        (14) 
Q follows the properties:  Q ! 0 @L QS T 0. The reason behind the negativity 
of the first order derivative of Q is discussed in the introduction.  
We are abstracting from any mixed combinations of outsourcing, integration 
without technology transfer (TT) and integration with TT. We will focus on three 
extreme cases: first where G entirely outsources input production; second on integration 
with own technology and the third is the integration with transferred technology from 
S. 
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Equation (12’) of Regime-I remains unchanged while equation (13) resembles the 
profit of integrating G when technology is not transferred. We need to calculate afresh 
the profit of integrating G with transferred technology. Let us denote it by FG,,UU. 
  The profit maximizing price of the integrating firm with efficient technology is 
(  BCD+-C	 1 O Q       (15) 
Substituting the new equilibrium price in the profit equation we get, 
FG,,UU  >. %&; . ; H ;J 1 O Q; I #$%&    (16) 
A careful investigation of equation (16) reveals that an increase in   would lead 
to a fall in Q and hence the value of  FG,,UU will be larger. One can easily use the 
thought process to compare as to what mode of organization gives higher profit 
(compare (12’) and (16)). This is evident from the evaluation that if the input technology 
is biased in favor of capital, technology should be transferred from S to G. In fact, a 
labor-saving technological progress can induce firm to transfer the technology and to 
integrate the entire production spectrum. In what follows, we can write down the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 2: Integrating mode of organization is preferred over outsourcing when input is 
capital intensive and conversely when intermediate-input uses relatively more labor.  
 
IV. INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM 
 Absence of any barriers to entry ensures zero profit for all firms in every mode of 
organization. Let us first consider the case of regime-I with outsourcing. Therefore, 
equation (12’) boils down to 
 >. %&; . ; H ;J K; I #$%&   0        (17) 
We know that, (  %&. V	    
From (10) we have                        >  '. 8; 
    Or, >  '.  *+-4756  
    Or, >  '. 
*+-4 
    Or, >  '. *+-4
                (18)  
Plugging (18) and the value of  ( into (17) one gets          
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L  '#$%& W%&;%&;. K;.   ; . ; W 12 I 1X K;X  Y%,   L  '#$%& W%&;%&;. K;.   ;. ; W1 I 1X K;X 
 
Y%,   L  3Z[BCD+-C \1 I ]        (19) 
This is the total number of varieties in the industry. It is apparent from (19) that n 
depends only on E,  and fixed cost of production. This expression does not contain 
anything like K,   @L Q. Therefore, for all different modes of organization total number 
of varieties of X must be identical.  
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we have developed a simple model of monopolistic competition 
with love-for variety preference. Final good production requires specific intermediate 
input. Final good producer can either integrate or outsource the input production unit. 
We have assumed away any genus of contract incompleteness, whatsoever. However, 
stand-alone input supplier is relatively efficient than integrated supplier. We have 
shown that in absence of technology transfer lowering the transaction cost of input 
induces outsourcing. Whereas, when technology is transferred at a certain cost 
outsourcing would be the preferred mode of organization if and only if the intermediate 
input is labor-intensive.  
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Appendix 
Integrating final good producer (G) maximizes the following profit function in absence 
of technology transfer. FG,  (.  I %& . .  I #$%&   (A.1) 
We further know that,               '. 8;. (;      (A.2) 
From (A.2) one gets,              
1^_`^a`  I *;          (A.3) 
The first order condition implies 
     ( I %&.   *;   
Or,  ( 1 I ;  %&.     
Or,  (  %& . 	      (A.4) 
Plugging (A.2) and (A.4) in (A.1), the profit equation reduces to  FG,  >. %&;. ; 	 I 1 .  ;  I #$%&    (A.5) 
This is the same equation that we have in text as equation (13). 
Following the same technique we can derive the profit maximizing equilibrium 
price for G when input is sourced from stand-alone supplier.  (  %& . V	        (A.6) 
In what follows, the profit for G with outsourced intermediate input becomes, FG,  (.  I %&. . K I #$%&     FG,  >. %&;. ; 	 I 1 . K; I #$%&       (A.7) 
This equation is identical with (12’) of the main text. 
However, with technology transfer (TT) the total cost function for producing 
intermediate input would be:    
 M  %&. . 1 O Q O #$%&      (A.8) 
Therefore the profit equation becomes, FG,,UU  (.  I %&. . 1 O Q I #$%&      (A.9) 
Above equation gives us the new profit-maximizing equilibrium price as (  %& . bc	        (A.10) 
Plugging (A.2), (A.8) and (A.10) into (A.9) one gets the equation identical with (16) of 
the main body of the paper. FG,,UU  >. %&; . ; 	 I 1 . 1 O Q; I #$%&      (A.11) 
